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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
__________ 
 
No. 17-3092 
__________ 
 
WILLIAM J. EINHORN, Administrator of the Teamsters Pension  
Trust Fund of Philadelphia and Vicinity 
 
v. 
 
PENN JERSEY BUILDING MATERIALS, INC.;  
AGATE CONSTRUCTION CO., INC.;  
TUCKAHOE SAND & GRAVEL CO., INC.; EASTERN TRANSIT MIX;  
JOHNSTON ENTERPRISES, INC.; DIAL BLOCK, INC.; JOHNSTON REALTY;  
ELJ REALTY; JAMES E. JOHNSTON, JR.; 
 
 
PENN JERSEY BUILDING MATERIALS, INC., Third Party Plaintiff 
 
v. 
 
TEAMSTERS LOCAL UNION NO 676, Third Party Defendant 
 
 
       Penn Jersey Building Materials, Inc., 
                                                                  Appellant 
__________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of New Jersey 
(D.N.J. No. 1-12-cv-06891) 
District Judge: Honorable Joseph H. Rodriguez 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
 May 25, 2018 
 
BEFORE:  MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: June 25, 2018) 
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__________ 
 
OPINION* 
__________ 
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge. 
 
 In M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, the Supreme Court invalidated the Sixth 
Circuit’s so-called Yard-Man inference, instructing that ordinary and traditional 
principles of contract interpretation are to apply to collective-bargaining agreements.1  
Appellant Penn Jersey Building Materials, Inc. argues that the District Court misapplied 
Tackett when determining that a section of the parties’ collective bargaining agreement 
did not absolve Penn Jersey from withdrawal liability.  After a thorough review of the 
briefing and the record, we conclude that the District Court correctly granted summary 
judgment to the Teamsters Local 676 and correctly denied summary judgment to Penn 
Jersey.  We will affirm. 
I. 
 
 We will dispense with the usual recitation of the full factual background and 
procedural history of this matter, as both are well-known to the parties and 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
1 ––– U.S. ––––, 135 S.Ct. 926, 930, 935 (2015).  See also Int’l Union, United Auto., 
Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of America, U.A.W. v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 
F.3d 130, 140 (3d Cir. 1999).  The “Yard-Man Inference” comes from Int’l Union, 
United Auto., Aerospace & Agr. Implement Workers of America, U.A.W. v. Yard-Man, 
Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983).   
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comprehensively set forth in the District Court’s memorandum.2  Briefly then, Penn 
Jersey and Teamsters Local 676 had a lengthy history of collective bargaining.  This case 
arose from a CBA between the parties in effect from April of 2005 until April of 2008.  
Language governing liability should one party withdraw from the Teamster’s Pension 
Trust Fund was a focal point of negotiation.  Ultimately, the parties agreed to resolve this 
point by adopting a provision that was already a part of another CBA—which we (and 
the parties) refer to as Section 7.  This provision stated that the CBA was executed “based 
upon the understanding that there is no unfounded (sic) pension liability with regard to 
the ‘Red Circle’ Pension Fund.  Therefore, should the Employer withdraw from the 
Agreement in the future, there will be no withdrawal liability.”  By its own terms, the 
CBA expired in April of 2008.  Penn Jersey stopped making payments to the pension 
fund that same year.  The Fund later notified Penn Jersey that the company had incurred 
withdrawal liability amounting to $961,281.59—more than half of which had accrued 
after Penn Jersey withdrew from the Fund.  
 The Fund sued Penn Jersey in the District Court, claiming the company was 
responsible for the withdrawal liability amount.  Penn Jersey filed a third-party complaint 
against Local 676.  It argued that Section 7 of the CBA absolved the company from 
making payments to the Fund and that, under the terms of that provision, the 
responsibility for doing so shifted to the Local.  The company maintained that Section 7 
remained operational even after the expiration of the CBA, giving Penn Jersey perpetual 
protection from any withdrawal liability.  Both the Local and Penn Jersey filed motions 
                                              
2 For this same reason, we will also dispense with citations to the record in this opinion. 
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for summary judgment.  The District Court granted summary judgment to Local 676 on 
Penn Jersey’s third-party complaint and denied summary judgment to Penn Jersey.  Penn 
Jersey has appealed the entry of summary judgment against it on its third-party 
complaint.  We will affirm.3 
II. 
 
 Penn Jersey takes issue with several aspects of the District Court’s decision.  The 
company tells us we should reverse the District Court’s decision because the court 
erroneously relied on Tackett, supra.  We will deal with this issue first.  Penn Jersey 
contends that Tackett is inapplicable because that decision’s instruction to use traditional 
principles of contract interpretation when reviewing collective bargaining agreements 
only applies when a court is deciding whether a contract provides for lifetime welfare 
benefits and does not apply generally to disputes of contract interpretation.  This 
argument is peculiar because that is exactly what the Supreme Court instructed in 
Tackett: ordinary principles of contract interpretation should apply generally to 
collective-bargaining agreements.4  The nature of the contract provision under review is 
not relevant.5  Tackett’s holding is neither controversial nor surprising in this Circuit 
                                              
3 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction 
to decide this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  Our review of a grant of summary 
judgment is plenary.  Ramara, Inc. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 814 F.3d 660, 665 (3d Cir. 
2016).  Summary judgment is appropriate if there are no genuine disputes of material fact 
and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); 
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).  In reviewing a summary 
judgment ruling, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.  
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248-49. 
4 135 S.Ct. at 933.    
5 Id. 
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where we have long held that ordinary contract principles are to be used by courts when 
reviewing and interpreting collective bargaining agreements.6   
 One traditional principle of contract interpretation is that “contractual obligations 
will cease, in the ordinary course, upon termination of the contract.”7  The Supreme 
Court noted that “an expired bargaining agreement has by its own terms released all its 
parties from their respective contractual obligations, except obligations already fixed 
under the contract but as yet unsatisfied.”8  The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has 
explained, “[a]bsent a longer time limit in the context of a specific provision, the general 
durational clause supplies a final phrase to every term in the CBA: ‘until this agreement 
ends.’”9  Here, Section 20.1 of the CBA specifically states it was in effect from April 1, 
2005 until April 30, 2008.  The CBA does not contain a “survival” clause—a provision 
which explicitly indicates which duties or obligations will continue beyond the life of a 
                                              
6 See, e.g., UAW v. Skinner Engine Co., 188 F.3d 130, 139 (3d Cir. 1999).  As our 
colleague Judge Krause recently noted in another unpublished decision, our jurisprudence 
is “arguably consistent with, rather than at odds with, Tackett.”  Grove v. Johnson 
Controls, Inc., 694 Fed. Appx. 864, 867 (3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Skinner, 188 F.3d at 
138).  Indeed, we expressly stated in Skinner that “traditional rules of contract 
construction apply [to interpretations of collective bargaining agreements] when not 
inconsistent with federal labor law.”  Skinner, 188 F.3d at 138.   
7 Tackett, 135 S.Ct. at 937 (quoting Litton Fin. Printing Div., a Div. of Litton Bus. Sys. 
Inc. v. NLRB, 501 U.S. 190, 207 (1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
8 Litton, 501 U.S. at 206. 
9 Gallo v. Moen Inc., 813 F.3d 265, 269 (6th Cir. 2016) (citing Litton, 501 U.S. at 207).  
Applying Tackett, the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit additionally noted that “[if 
Tackett] tells us anything, however, it is that the use of the future tense without more—
without words committing to retain the benefit for life—does not guarantee lifetime 
benefits.”  Id. at 721 (citing Tackett, 135 S.Ct. at 937). 
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contract, and how long those obligations or duties are to endure.10  Section 7 is likewise 
silent on whether its duties and obligations are to continue past the life of the agreement, 
and given the lack of any explicit language in that section or anywhere else in the 
agreement, Section 7 is controlled by the CBA’s general durational clause and expired 
when the CBA did in 2008.11 
 Penn Jersey stopped making contributions to the Fund in January of 2008.  The 
record reveals that no withdrawal penalty was assessed from that time until the CBA 
expired in April of that year.  Penn Jersey withdrew from the Fund in 2009, meaning that 
any withdrawal liability assessed against the company was done well after the CBA had 
expired.  Penn Jersey argues that Section 7 remains vibrant because, to hold otherwise, is 
to render that provision unnecessary.  Not so.  Here, we agree with the District Court that 
this provision was relevant and had significance to the parties during the life of the CBA.  
 A reference to the “future” in Section 7 does not connote perpetuity.  As the Court 
in Gallo noted, “[if Tackett] tells us anything, however, it is that the use of the future 
tense without more—without words committing to retain the benefit for life—does not 
guarantee lifetime benefits.”12  Here, given the absence of such express language, Section 
                                              
10 See e.g., United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO v. American Smelting and Refining 
Co., 648 F.2d 863, 878 (3d Cir. 1981); AAMCO Transmissions, Inc. v. Romano, 42 
F.Supp.3d 700, 707 (E.D. Pa. 2014). 
11 See 20 Richard A. Lord, Williston on Contracts § 55:27 (4th ed.) (“[R]ights under a 
collective bargaining agreement that are not vested or accrued are strictly creatures of the 
agreement, and do not extend beyond the expiration of the contract.”); see also 
Cincinnati Typographical Union No. 3, Local 14519 v. Gannett Satellite Info. Network, 
Inc., 17 F.3d 906, 910-11 (6th Cir. 1994).  
12 Gallo, 813 F.3d at 271 (citing Tackett, 135 S.Ct. at 937). 
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7 does not survive the expiration of the CBA.  Nor does this reference to the “future” 
create a survivability clause.13   
 Penn Jersey claims that Section 7 is ambiguous because this language—“should 
the Employer withdraw from the Agreement in the future there will be no withdraw[al] 
liability”—can be interpreted as extending liability beyond the life of the agreement.  
Otherwise, they argue, Section 7 is unnecessary.  The District Court rejected this 
argument, as do we.  This provision was operational during the term of the CBA and, 
indeed, operated to Penn Jersey’s benefit from January of 2008 until the CBA expired in 
April of that same year.  This provision was neither unnecessary nor meaningless if 
construed not to survive the CBA because it had significance during the life of the 
agreement.14  
 Nor has there been a breach of the agreement, as Penn Jersey contends.  Penn 
Jersey maintains that Section 7 of the CBA first contains a promise that the Union not 
assess withdrawal liability against the company, and second, that the Union would 
indemnify Penn Jersey for any future assessment of withdrawal penalties.  We disagree.  
Section 7 does not obligate the Union such that its failure to do something could 
constitute a breach.  The provision contains no language evidencing an agreement by the 
Union to prevent or protect Penn Jersey from withdrawal liability should the company 
step away from the CBA.   
                                              
13 See, e.g., Skinner, 188 F.3d at 141.   
14 See Tackett, 135 S.Ct. at 936. 
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 Finally, we reject any reading of Section 7 that requires the Union to indemnify 
Penn Jersey’s withdrawal liability.  An agreement for one party to indemnify another is 
an extraordinary obligation.15  As such, language outlining this extraordinary obligation 
should be specifically and expressly stated in the CBA.16  No language in Section 7 
comes close to expressing any such obligation.  Therefore, we will neither find nor infer 
any indemnification obligation. 
III. 
 Hence, we conclude the District Court correctly granted summary judgment to 
Local 676 and correctly denied summary judgment to Penn Jersey.  We will affirm. 
                                              
15 Jacob Constructors, Inc. v. NPS Energy Services, Inc., 264 F.3d 365, 372 (3d Cir. 
2001) (citations omitted). 
16 Id. 
